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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

erty, or affairs of a like nature and under like circumstances, and failure
to do so in negligence, for which pledgee is responsible." 2
2. "A pledge agreement is to be interpreted and enforced like other
contracts, in order to carry out the intent of the parties.
3. "Whether pledgee of interim receipt for bonds was negligent in
not procuring delivery of bonds or trustee's certificates where seller
of bonds failed before permanent bonds were deliverey held for the
jury."
EARL

J. O'BRIEN

Rate Maling: Public Utilities.
McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Company (272 U. S. 400) (47 Sup.
Ct. 144).
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the now famous
O'Fallon Railroad Case has directed the attention of lawyers and
the public in general, as investors and consumers, to the state of the
law in the field of rate-making for public service companies, and the
crux of this interest is an attempt to discover a valid, workable method
which may be used to evaluate such companies.
A typical case on this phase of the law is McCardle v. Indianapolis
Water Company, supra, in which the Water Company sought an injunction restraining .McCardle as a member of the Public Service
Commission of Indiana, from enforcing water-rates established by
that body, for the reason that such rates did not yield an adequate
return on the capital invested. The suit was brought in the Federal
District Court of Indiana, resort to the federal court being had on the
ground that the rates in question were so inadequate that they resulted
in a confiscation of property, "without due process of law," in opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment. The public Service Commission
(McCardle et al) in company with the City of Indianapolis, which
had intervened, appealed from a decree in favor of the Water Company. The sole question presented for the consideration of the court
was the proper method of determining the value of the Water Company's property. The Commission submitted valuations made by its
own engineers and the company submitted like reports made by two
different firms of valuation engineers, each of these estimates differing
by at least $1,000,000 from the others.
The Supreme Court sustained the decree of the District Court but decided the findings below were not as "specific as good practice re221 R. C. L., 664 et seq.; Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, McLemore v.
Bank, 91 U. S. 27, 23 L. Ed. 43 Wis. 329: 196.
1279 U. S. 461.

NOTES AND COMMENT

quired" and rather than remand the case, and thus prolong litigation,
it would examine the record and decide the case on its merits.
The principal difficulty confronting the courts today in the field
of rate-making is the general disturbance of prices and the change in
money values brought about by the World War. In valuing public
utilities, one of the main facts to be considered is the relative value of
the original cost as compared with the present cost of reproduction.
The difference in costs of materials and labor before the war and the
post-war costs is so great than valuation on this basis would give a
greatly enhanced value to public utilities which would permit excessive
rates under the guise of a fair return on the property devoted to public
service. Therefore an average of prices during a ten year period was
taken, and it was discovered that there was general stability of prices
showing a tendency to remain at the high post-war level.
The court set down three main factors which must be considered as
essentials of valuation in the present case and these are: (1) the present value of the lands plus the present cost of constructing the plant,
less depreciation; (2) the water rights of the company; that is, the
value of the privilege of taking water from natural sources owned by
the government; and (3) the going value of the utility itself which is
intangible and is separate from the physical parts. As to the first of
these factors (present cost of reproduction), it is only when prices
show a tendency neither upwards nor downwards, and it does not appear probable that there will be a substantial change, that such factor
may be arbitrarily applied. In cases where there has been great fluctuation in prices the weight to be given to such costs and figures is to
be determined in the light of the facts of the case in hand. Such fluctuation in value may occur in two ways: (1) "where there is no change
in the purchasing power of the dollar by reason of various circumstances such as the natural increment of land values in a growing city;
and (2) by a decrease in the purchasing power or value of the dollar."
In reaching a proper figure of valuation, the Court kept in mind the
necessity of setting a rate which would be practical not only at present
but for several years to come.
As a result of these considerations, it was concluded that the value
of the Water Company was considerably above the estimates of two of
the submitted valuation reports which had been computed on a basis of
average prices over a ten year period ending with 1923.
As to the second and third factors, (water-rights and going value)
the court held that an allowance equal to 92 per cent of the value of
the physical property of the company was not excessive.
Further, the court held that a return of 7 per cefit was quite reasonable and cited cases to show where higher rates had been sustained.
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In commenting on this rate the court said, "It is obvious that rates
of yield on investments in bonds, plus brokerage, is substantially less
than the rate of return required to constitute just compensation for the
use of properties in the public service."
It may be noted that Justice Holmes concurred in the result, while
Justice Brandeis wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Stone
joined.

T. W.

HAYDEN

